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Abstract
Reasoning that takes into account self-locating evidence in apparently
plausible ways sometimes yields the startling conclusion that rational cre-
dences are such as if agents had bizarre causal powers. The present pa-
per introduces a novel version of the Sleeping Beauty problem—Choosing
Beauty—for which the response to the problem advocated by David Lewis
unappealingly yields this conclusion. Furthermore, it suggests as a general
desideratum for approaches to problems of self-locating belief that they
should not recommend credences that are as if anyone had anomalous
causal powers. Adopting this desideratum, as the paper shows, yields uni-
formly plausible verdicts on the most-discussed problems of self-locating
belief.
Keywords: Doomsday Argument · Sleeping Beauty · self-locating belief ·
anomalous causal powers
1 Introduction
Reasoning that takes into account self-locating evidence in apparently plausi-
ble ways often yields startling, sometimes spectacular, conclusions. One of the
weirdest is that in some cases agents appear to be rationally entitled to reason
as if they had “anomalous causal powers” (Bostrom (2001) p. 368). Bostrom
proposes some scenarios where this happens, which are, incidentally, not among
the most-discussed problems of self-locating belief in the literature: the three
Adam and Eve experiments and the UN++-Gedanken experiment, all introduced
and discussed by Bostrom (2001).
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This paper has three aims: first, it highlights how apparent anomalous
causal powers appear in the notorious Doomsday Argument (Gott (1993), Leslie
(1996)); second, it proposes a novel version of the Sleeping Beauty (SB) prob-
lem (Elga (2000))—Choosing Beauty (CB)—for which the halfer view of the
SB problem as advocated by Lewis (2001) yields apparent anomalous causal
powers; third, it suggests that approaches to problems of self-locating belief
are to be viewed in light of the desideratum that they should not recommend
credences that are as if anyone had anomalous causal powers, and it highlights
that assigning credences in accordance with this desideratum yields uniformly
plausible results.
2 How anomalous causal powers appear
Consider the following story due to Bostrom:
Assume [...] that Adam and Eve were once the only people and that
they know for certain that if they have a child they will be driven
out of Eden and will have billions of descendants. [...] [T]hey have
a foolproof way of generating a child, perhaps using advanced in
vitro fertilization. Adam is tired of getting up every morning to go
hunting. Together with Eve, he devises the following scheme: They
form the firm intention that unless a wounded deer limps by their
cave, they will have a child. Adam can then put his feet up and
rationally expect with near certainty that a wounded deer—an easy
target for his spear—will soon stroll by. (Bostrom (2001), p. 367)
Adam’s and Eve’s reasoning seems bizarre, but it is surprisingly difficult to
determine what, if anything, is wrong with it. We can formalise it as follows:
let H1 be the hypothesis that some wounded deer will turn up, which means that
Adam and Eve will refrain from having children and, accordingly, will remain
the only humans ever to exist. So, the total number of observers ever to exist
according to H1 is N1 = 2. Next, let H2 be the alternative hypothesis that
no wounded deer will turn up such that Adam and Eve, following their firm
intention, will have children so that, at the end of the world many thousands,
millions or billions of years later, a large number, say, N2 = 10
9 of observers
will have existed. Furthermore, let us use some principle of indifference (such as
Bostrom’s self-sampling assumption (SSA) (Bostrom (2001), p. 360)) according
to which, conditional on Hi (with i = 1, 2), Adam and Eve should ascribe the
probability 1/Ni to being any of the Ni observers ever to have lived according
to Hi.
1 For example, their prior conditional credence of being the n-th observer
1Indifference principles have received their fair share of criticism (see e.g. Weatherson
(2005), Schwarz (2015), but, for a partial vindication, also Manley (unpublished)), so the
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ever to have lived (n ≤ N1) is:
cr(n|Hi) = 1
Ni
. (1)
Now let us allow Adam to use his knowledge that he is the first observer ever
to have lived (n = 1), which results in:
cr(H1|n = 1)
cr(H2|n = 1) =
cr(n = 1|H1)cr(H1)
cr(n = 1|H2)cr(H2)
=
N2
N1
· cr(H1)
cr(H2)
(2)
where the first line uses Bayes’ theorem and the second uses Eq. (1) together
with the fact that n = 1 is compatible with both H1 and H2. Assuming Bayesian
conditioning and that Adam has a very small prior credence that a wounded
deer will turn up, say, cr(H1) = 10
−7 (which means cr(H2) = 1 − 10−7), we
obtain for his rational posteriors:
cr(H1|n = 1)
cr(H2|n = 1) =
109
2
· 10
−7
1− 10−7 ≈ 50 . (3)
So, if he uses his knowledge that he is the first human ever to have lived, Adam
will be confident that a wounded deer will walk by.2
As Bostrom notes, this verdict on Adam’s rational posterior credences is
highly counterintuitive:
We [...] have [...] the appearance of psychokinesis. If the example
works, which it does if we assume SSA [i.e. Eq. (1)], it almost seems
as if Adam is causing a wounded deer to walk by. For how else could
one explain the coincidence? Adam knows that he can repeat the
procedure morning after morning and that he should expect a deer
to appear each time. Some mornings he may not form the relevant
intention and on those mornings no deer turns up. It seems too
good to be mere chance; Adam is tempted to think he has magical
powers. (Bostrom (2001), p. 367)
Adopting Bostrom’s term, I will say that Adam’s posterior credences are as
if he had “anomalous causal powers” (Bostrom (2001) p. 368).3 According to
use of Eq. (1), is not an innocent step, and it may be tempting to blame the unattractive
conclusion to be reached in Eq. (3) on the use of Eq. (1). However, as I argue further below,
it seems unlikely that replacing Eq. (1) by some potentially more plausible alternative avoids
all the unattractive features of the conclusion.
2The conclusion persists qualitatively even if a prior much smaller than cr(H1) = 10−7 is
used. Even if Adam is then no longer confident that a wounded deer will turn up, he will still
seem overly optimistic given how far-fetched the possibility really is.
3Bostrom discusses two other Adam and Eve experiments, Serpent’s Advice and Eve’s
Card Trick, which involve apparent anomalous causal powers in similar ways: in Serpent’s
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Bostrom, strange though Adam’s credences seem, they look less unacceptable if
we realise that an important bit of evidence that we have—namely, that there
will be many other observers besides Adam and Eve, including us—is simply
unavailable to Adam. Bostrom concedes that the recommendation that Adam
should really have credences that conform to Eq. (3) is “deeply counterintuitive”
(Bostrom (2002), p. 157), but he also points out that accepting them does not
mean to ascribe real anomalous powers to Adam and Eve: “There is [...] no
reason to ascribe anomalous causal powers to Adam. Eve and Adam would ra-
tionally think otherwise but they would simply be mistaken.” (Bostrom (2001),
p. 373)4 Contrary to this remark, given the apparent implausibility of Adam’s
reasoning, it would seem preferable to reject Adam’s conclusion outright—or,
more generally, the type of reasoning on which it is based.
The apparently most straightforward way of doing so—rejecting the indiffer-
ence principle Eq. (1)—is unpromising: for unless one assumes that cr(n|H2),
as a function of n, is highly peaked around n = 1, 2 (which is necessary to
have cr(n = 1|H1) ≈ cr(n = 1|H2)), the effect that the ratio of the posteriors
cr(H1|n)/cr(H2|n) differs strongly from the ratio of the priors cr(H1)/cr(H2)
will persist, and this will suffice to reproduce Adam’s conclusion in its quali-
tative features. Moreover, in a hypothetical situation where one knows H2 to
be true, i.e. that there are in total N2 = 10
9 observers, but where one has
not the faintest idea who among them one is, there is just no reason to assume
with near certainty that one will be among the very first two ever to exist (as
cr(n = 1|H1) ≈ cr(n = 1|H2) would require). To conclude, it is difficult to
see how one might justify evaluating cr(n|H2) in a manner sufficiently different
from Eq. (1) to avoid the conclusion reached by Adam in its qualitative features.
One can set up the notorious Doomsday Argument in analogy with Lazy
Adam such that it recommends reasoning as if someone had anomalous causal
powers. In its simplest version, the Doomsday Argument is also about two
hypotheses H1 and H2 that differ on the total number of humans ever to exist
(N1 and N2). Using numbers borrowed from (Bostrom (2001)), either N1 = 200
billions or N2 = 200 trillion humans are going to have lived. Let us assume
that our empirical evidence suggests an optimistic assignment of probabilities
Pr(H1) = 0.05 and Pr(H2) = 0.95, which we translate into priors cr(H1) = 0.05
Advice these powers have the flavour of “anomalous precognition” (Bostrom (2001), p. 367),
and in Eve’s Card Trick they appear as apparent anomalous “backward causation” (Bostrom
(2001), p. 368). This last example demonstrates that apparent anomalous causal powers need
not be forward directed in time.
4In his book (Bostrom (2002)), Bostrom offers an account that supposedly avoids these
counterintuitive recommendations. The core idea of that account is to change to a more fine-
grained reference class that includes not observers but observer stages (“observer moments”).
One worry with respect to this proposal is that unless the very structure of Adam’s reasoning in
the above example is shown to be faulty, there remains the risk that similarly counterintuitive
conclusions may arise for any reference class, however well chosen.
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and cr(H2) = 0.95. Finally, assume that you learn that you are the 60-billionth
observer to exist, which, by analogous reasoning as in Lazy Adam, leads to the
following ratio of posterior credences (with n = 60 billion < N1):
cr(H1|n)
cr(H2|n) =
cr(n|H1)cr(H1)
cr(n|H2)cr(H2)
=
N2
N1
· Pr(H1)
Pr(H2)
.
= 1000 · 0.05
0.95
≈ 50 (4)
It appears that you should expect H1 to be true even if the input probability
Pr(H1) was substantially lower than the input probability Pr(H2). As the
parallels between Eqs. (2) and (4) show, the Doomsday argument is analogous
to the Lazy Adam scenario both in its conclusion and in the structure of the
underlying reasoning.
To highlight the appearance of anomalous causal powers in the Doomsday
Argument, assume that whether H1 or H2 holds depends on the success of a
group of terrorists, who are trying to construct a pernicious machine which, if
completed, would put an immediate end to humanity (and, so, make H1 true).
Fortunately, constructing this machine is difficult and the objective chance of
the terrorists to succeed is a meager Pr(H1) = 0.05. (We have some experience
with the construction of machines that are of the same type but less pernicious,
which allows us to assign this probability). If they succeed, N1 = 200 billions of
humans will have lived, if not, N2 = 200 trillions. Based on the information that
you are the 60-billionth human being to be born and using the same reasoning
as in Eq. (4) you should have credence cr(H1|n) ≈ 0.98 that the terrorists will
succeed in their work.
Earlier work on the Doomsday argument (e.g. Leslie (1996)) highlights that,
if the argument is valid, we should take any factors that may cause humanity
to go extinct much more serious than we would otherwise do. Looking at the
argument through the lens of apparent anomalous causal powers, this warning
translates into the recommendation that we should treat people trying to bring
about the end of humanity—e.g. the terrorists—as if having enhanced causal
powers and people trying to preserve humanity as if having reduced causal
powers.
To illustrate how odd this conclusion is, consider some nerdy enthusiast of the
type of machine that the terrorists try to construct. According to the Doomsday
argument, if he cares more about contributing to the successful construction
of such a machine than about humanity’s future, joining the terrorists is an
excellent strategy for him to achieve his aims—even if he could collaborate with
5
more skilled collaborators when constructing the machine for neutral, perhaps
even humanity-preserving, purposes. This recommendation seems extremely
difficult to accept.
There have been many critics of the Doomsday Argument:5 for example,
Norton (2010) regards it as reflecting badly on the Bayesian methodology used
to derive its conclusion; Eckhardt (1993), Bostrom (2001) (see fn. (4)) and Neal
(2006), along different lines, hold that it is an artefact of an arbitrary and/or
inappropriate choice of reference class.
Most interestingly for the further course of this paper, Dieks, building on ear-
lier arguments by himself (Dieks (1992)) and Olum (2002), accepts the reasoning
in Eq. (4) but proposes a different numerical evaluation of the expressions used
there by identifying the input probabilities (Pr(H1) = 0.05 and Pr(H2) = 0.95
in our example) with the posteriors cr(H1|n) and cr(H2|n) rather than the
priors cr(H1) and cr(H2). His central argument is that the input probabili-
ties Pr(H1) and Pr(H2) translate into our rational credences when we are at
least roughly aware of our birth rank, not in the absence of knowledge as to
whether we live before the potential early end of humanity or after it. Cor-
respondingly, when applied to Lazy Adam, Dieks’ reasoning yields posteriors
cr(H1|n = 1) = Pr(H1) = 10−7 and cr(H2|n = 1) = Pr(H2) = 1 − 10−7
according to which, as seems plausible, Adam should not expect any wounded
deer to turn up.
The main reason why Dieks’ strikingly simple proposal remains controversial
is that it leads to priors cr(H1) and cr(H2) that differ from the input probabili-
ties Pr(H1) and Pr(H2), which is an unattractive recommendation for example
in cosmological theory choice (as highlighted by the Presumptuous Philosopher
scenario due to Bostrom (Bostrom (2001), p. 124)). We will briefly look at this
difficulty in Section 5 and consider how one may accept Dieks’ proposal without
encountering it. In the meantime, let us look for apparent anomalous causal
powers in the Sleeping Beauty problem, which, as pointed out by Dieks and
Bradley Bradley (2012), has a similar structure as the Doomsday Argument.
3 Sleeping Beauty and Choosing Beauty
The Sleeping Beauty problem as formulated by Elga goes as follows:
Some researchers are going to put you to sleep. During the two days
that your sleep will last, they will briefly wake you up either once
5There are others besides Leslie who, partly with reservations, defend its conclusion, no-
tably Pisaturo (2009), Lewis (2010), and Bradley (2012), who argue (along different lines)
that the conclusion is only apparently so implausible and only when viewed through the lens
of the distorting and misleading characterization of H1 as “doom soon”.
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or twice, depending on the toss of a fair coin (Heads: once; Tails:
twice). After each waking, they will put you to [sic] back to sleep
with a drug that makes you forget that waking. When you are first
awakened, to what degree ought you believe that the outcome of the
coin toss is Heads? (Elga (2000) p. 143)
Opinions are split over the correct answer. The two candidate rational cre-
dences for Beauty (“you”, in Elga’s example) with respect to Heads are 1/2
and 1/3, both of which have substantial support in the literature. The simplest
arguments in favor of the 1/3-view are the following (where, in accordance with
convention, Beauty’s first awakening is supposed to take place on Monday and
the second, which occurs only if the coin falls Tails, on Tuesday): first, if the
experiment is repeated many times, approximately 1/3 of the awakenings are
Heads-awakenings; second, on the 1/2-view, if on Monday someone tells Beauty
it is Monday, standard Bayesian conditioning tells her to shift her credence with
respect to Heads from 1/2 to 2/3, i.e.6
cr−(Heads) = 1/2
Monday−→ cr+(Heads) (5)
= cr−(Heads|Monday) = 2/3 .
This means that Beauty’s rational credence with respect to Heads differs from
its objective chance Pr(Heads) = 1/2, even though, knowing it is Monday,
Beauty is now fully oriented about her temporal position. in apparent contra-
diction with David Lewis’ famous Principal Principle (Lewis (1980)).7
The most important argument against the 1/3-view is that, in analogy with
Dieks’ response to the Doomsday Argument, it exemplifies a type of reasoning
6I use “cr−” to denote Beauty’s credences on Monday before she knows it is Monday and
“cr+” to denote her credences when she does know it is Monday.
7Elga presents his arguments in favor of the 1/3-view in (Elga (2000)). Lewis’ response
supporting the 1/2-answer and rejecting the argument based on the Principal Principle is
given in (Lewis (2001)). The essential statement of Lewis’ response is that Beauty acquires
inadmissible evidence when she learns that it is Monday, which disqualifies straightforward
use of the Principal Principle. This statement seems somewhat surprising, since when Beauty
learns that it is Monday what essentially happens is that she ceases to be disoriented about
her temporal location, hardly an uncontroversial instance of inadmissible evidence acquisition.
The matter remains controversial, however, for a strong case on Lewis’ behalf, see Bradley
(2011).
It is impossible to do justice to the by now very extensive literature on the Sleeping Beauty
problem, see (Titelbaum (2013b)) for a condensed overview. For some defences of the thirder
position, see (Dorr (2002), Horgan (2004), Hitchcock (2004), Draper & Pust (2008), Titelbaum
(2008), Schulz (2010), Titelbaum (2013a)), for some criticisms of it, sometimes combined with
an endorsement of Lewisian halfing, see (Jenkins (2005), White (2006), Bradley & Leitgeb
(2006), Bradley (2011; 2012)). Further important studies include (Kierland & Monton (2005),
Briggs (2010), Ross (2010), Schwarz (2015)). Articles that defend or criticise the third main
position on Sleeping Beauty, the so-called “double-halfer” position, are briefly addressed in
the main text further below.
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that yields implausible conclusions in cosmological theory choice. These will be
briefly discussed in Section 5 of this paper. The essential analogy between the
thirder position on Sleeping Beauty and Dieks’ response to the Doomsday Argu-
ment is that both identify the input probabilities—in Beauty’s case the chances
Pr(Heads) and Pr(Tails), in the Doomsday case the probabilities Pr(H1) and
Pr(H2)—with the credences one should have when, not before, one has the
relevant bits of self-locating information “it is Monday” and “n is my birth
rank”. Conversely, the halfer position on Sleeping Beauty and the Doomsday
Argument identify the input probabilities with the credences one should have
before, not when, one has the self-locating information. Both Dieks and Bradley
highlight these connections between viable positions on Sleeping Beauty and the
Doomsday Argument (Dieks (2007) and Bradley (2012)), Dieks while defend-
ing the thirder position and rejecting the Doomsday Argument, Bradley while
defending the Lewisian halfer position and endorsing the Doomsday Argument.
In addition to the thirder position as defended by Elga and Dieks and the
halfer position as defended by Lewis and Bradley there is an additional, third,
position on Sleeping Beauty. Its adherents Halpern (2005), Bostrom (2007),
Meacham (2008), Cozic (2011) concur with Lewisian halfers that Beauty’s cre-
dence with respect to Heads should be 1/2 when she awakes, but they also claim
that it should remain 1/2 when she learns that it is Monday. I have little to say
about this interesting alternative to thirding and Lewisian halfing, except that
it faces the following serious problem (Bradley (2011), Titelbaum (2012)): if a
coin is tossed on Tuesday evening in addition to the first one (tossed on Sunday
or Monday evening), then, as is easily shown, according to the double-halfer
position Beauty’s credence with respect to “Today’s coin will fall Heads” when
awakening must be larger than 1/2. However, when she learns what day it is,
her rational credence with respect to this proposition drops to 1/2, no matter
what she learns. This makes Beauty’s epistemic position oddly unstable before
she is informed what day it is.8
Given the similarities between Lewisian (“non-double”) halfing and the Dooms-
day Argument, can we construct a version of the Sleeping Beauty problem
in which Lewisian halfing recommends credences that are as if someone (say,
Beauty herself) had anomalous causal powers? We can, as the Choosing Beauty
problem shows:
Choosing Beauty (CB): As in the original Sleeping Beauty problem,
Beauty is woken either once (on Monday) or twice (on Monday and
Tuesday), depending on the outcome of a fair coin toss (one awak-
ening if the coin comes up Heads, two if it comes up Tails). All her
memories of any previous awakenings during the trial are erased by
8See (Conitzer (2015)) for a further strong criticism of double-halfing.
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a drug whenever she is put to sleep. This time, however, two coin
tosses are performed, both on Monday evening. After having been
woken on Monday, Beauty is told that it is Monday and is asked to
choose whether the outcome of the first or the second coin toss to
be performed the same evening is to count as relevant for whether
or not she is woken on Tuesday. In accordance with the outcome of
that coin toss, she is woken or not woken on Tuesday.
Let us refer to Beauty’s two possible choices as C1 (“The first coin toss counts”)
and C2 (“The second coin toss counts”). Now consider one of the coin tosses,
say, the first, and consider Beauty’s rational credences with respect to its possi-
ble outcomes Heads1 and Tails1, as assessed from the point of view of Lewisian
halfing. According to this position as applied in the original SB problem,
Beauty’s rational credence with respect to the outcome Heads on the cho-
sen coin is 1/2 on Monday morning and 2/3 after she has been told that it is
Monday. There is no reason to suppose that her rational credences about the
possible outcomes of the coin toss she does not choose are at any stage differ-
ent from 1/2. To conclude, by the standards of Lewisian halfing, after Beauty
has been told that it is Monday, her rational conditional credences with respect
to Heads1 are cr
+(Heads1|C1) = 23 and cr+(Heads1|C2) = 12 , and similarly
(mutatis mutandis) for the other possible outcomes of the two tosses.
What seems odd about these credences is not only that there is some future
(or past, if the coins are tossed on Sunday) coin toss with respect to which,
as in the original SB puzzle, cr+(Heads) = 2/3 6= Pr(Heads) = 1/2, but
that the identity of this coin toss (which one it is) depends on a choice Beauty
makes at the very same stage. The thirder position concurs with Lewisian half-
ing that there is some stage at which Beauty’s credence with respect Heads
for the chosen coin should depart from 1/2 in that, according to thirdism,
cr−(Heads1|C1) = 1/3 and cr−(Heads2|C2) = 1/3 for her credences before
she is told it is Monday. However, this is not a situation where she can be given
the choice between C1 and C2, for giving her the choice means telling her it
is Monday. On Tuesday, the coin toss whose outcome decides whether she is
woken once or twice has already been tossed (and, if she has been woken, fallen
Tails). So, giving her the choice between C1 and C2 tells her it is Monday and,
thereby, lets her credence shift to cr+(Heads1) = cr
−(Heads1|C1∧Monday) =
cr−(Heads1|C2 ∧Monday) = 1/2. Accordingly, as soon as Beauty can make
her choice, her rational credences about possible outcomes are all equal to 1/2,
so that, unlike according to Lewisian halfing, there is no stage at which she
simultaneously has the choice between C1 and C2 and a rational credence with
respect to Heads that differs from 1/2 for some toss.
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4 Biting the bullet?
As already noted, credences that are such as if someone had anomalous causal
powers appear weird and counterintuitive. But perhaps this appearance is mis-
leading. Perhaps it is sometimes rational to have such credences even though
they appear odd on superficial reflection. To pursue this suggestion, let us
explore a bit further the consequences of Lewisian halfing in CB.
In order to make them most vivid, it is useful to have in mind the “extreme”
version of CB (“Extreme Sleeping Beauty”, Bostrom (2007), p. 66), where, if
the chosen coin comes up Tails, Beauty is woken not twice, but N times on
subsequent days for some very large number N  1. In that scenario, according
to Lewisian halfing, Beauty’s rational conditional credences when she learns it
is Monday are cr+(Heads1|C1) = N−1N ≈ 1 and cr+(Tails1|C1) = 1N ≈ 0
and, trivially, cr+(Heads1|C2) = cr+(Tails1|C2) = 12 (and equivalently under
exchange of the indices 1 and 2).
What makes Beauty’s credences odd here is that they are analogous to those
of a person who is in a position to choose between two coins to be tossed as to
which of them should be manipulated (by affecting its internal mass distribution,
say), such that the outcome of its toss becomes almost certainly Heads. By way
of manipulating the coin, such a person would be able to causally influence the
outcome of its toss, and the parallel between that person’s rational credences
and Beauty’s according to Lewisian halfing confirm that the latter are indeed
as if Beauty had anomalous causal powers in the sense discussed. In particular,
just as it would be rational for that person to manipulate the first coin to be
tossed by modifying its internal mass distribution if she wanted its outcome
to be Heads, according to Lewisian halfing it would apparently be rational for
Beauty to make the choice C1 if she wished that the outcome of the first coin
toss should be Heads1. Accordingly, yet implausibly, putting oneself in the same
situation as Beauty and choosing the first coin would be practically equivalent
with manipulating it directly.
To avoid this unattractive recommendation, proponents of Lewisian halfing
may appeal to causal decision theory. More specifically, they might suggest
that even though Beauty’s rational credences are as if she had anomalous causal
powers, these odd credences are not the ones that should guide her actions and
decisions. To argue for this, Lewisian halfers might compare Beauty’s situation
in CB to that of a subject in a medical Newcomb problem. In a typical such
problem, there is some disease B for which bodily feature A is a symptom, such
that A’s first appearance reliably indicates that the person will fall ill with B
some days later. Given the available statistical data, A and B are positively
probabilistically correlated in that Pr(B|A) > Pr(B), which manifests itself in
the subject’s rational credences cr(B|A) > cr(B). This correlation, however, is
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not due to A’s causing B, but, instead, due to there being some bodily state
C—the presence of certain bacteria in the organism, say—that typically leads to
both A and B and that screens off A from B in that Pr(B|A∧C) = Pr(B|C).
Evidently, for a subject that faces a medical Newcomb problem, taking pre-
cautions against A that are not effective against C is an ineffective strategy
for avoiding B. What makes medical Newcomb problems philosophically chal-
lenging is the question of whether standard (evidential) decision theory gives
correct recommendations for rational action in them or whether an alternative
causal decision theory is needed.9 This debate aside, there is nothing partic-
ularly mysterious about them: it is unsurprising that medical Newcomb-type
scenarios arise in practice, and it is uncontroversial that the rational course
of action in them is not to combat the symptom A, at least not without also
fighting the cause C.
I have speculated that proponents of Lewisian halfing might try to accom-
modate the apparently odd consequences of their position with respect to CB
by appealing to causal decision theory and conceiving of CB as in essential re-
spects analogous to a medical Newcomb problem. The crucial parallels between
both cases are: first, that an agent can supposedly control some variable—the
presence of the symptom A in the medical Newcomb problem and the outcome
of the choice between C1 and C2 in CB; second, that the value of that variable is
probabilistically correlated with some later event—the disease B in the medical
Newcomb problem and the outcome of the coin toss chosen by Beauty in CB;
and, third, that there is no causal influence from the controllable variable to the
later event.
Pointing out these parallels, proponents of Lewisian halfing might argue that
Beauty in the CB scenario should regard the outcome of her choice between C1
and C2 as merely symptomatic of the outcome of the chosen coin toss, just as
the subject in a medical Newcomb problem should regard the symptom A as
symptomatic of whether she or he will fall ill with B some days later. And
indeed, this seems to be Bostrom’s perspective on Lazy Adam, with respect to
which he recommends that Adam may regard his “choice [as] an indication of a
coincidence” (Bostrom (2001), p. 371), namely one between the outcome of the
choice itself and the later course of events. So, given all these parallels, is the
CB scenario as seen from the perspective of Lewsian halfing perhaps no more
odd and problematic than a medical Newcomb problem?
Arguably not, for at some point the parallels end. In a medical Newcomb
problem, correlations are non-mysterious and rational actions uncontroversial
due to there being the state C which, as explained, screens off A from B in
9See (Lewis (1981)) and (Price (1986)) for examples of important contributions on the two
different sides of the debate.
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that Pr(B|A ∧ C) = Pr(B|C). If medical research finds no state C with the
required properties, the conditions for a medical Newcomb problem are not met,
and taking precautions against A is (defeasibly) considered an effective means
for preventing B. In the CB scenario, Lewisian halfers cannot point to any
state or event C such that cr+(Heads1|C1 ∧ C) = cr+(Heads1|C1 ∧ C), i.e.
there is just no reason to expect screening off between C1 and Heads1 as far
as Beauty’s rational credences are concerned. So, unlike a subject in a medical
Newcomb problem, if Beauty accepts the Lewisian halfer’s recommendations,
she has no comparable reasons to not take the probabilities cr+(Heads1|C1) and
cr+(Heads1|C2) as the ones to base her rational actions on. This suggests that,
according to Lewisian halfing as applied to the CB scenario, not only Beauty’s
rational credences but also her rational actions are as if she had anomalous
causal powers.
Given these implausible consequences of Lewisian halfing when applied to
CB, proponents may suggest that their position is correct only for SB but not for
CB. This does not seem to be an attractive reaction, however, because there is
little independent motivation to treat SB and CB differently. If Lewisian halfers
choose it nevertheless, this is highly interesting and an important clarification
of their position.
5 Conclusion and outlook
I conclude by offering some more general remarks on how considerations on
apparent anomalous causal powers may be used to shed light on problems of
self-locating belief.
The contrast between halfer- and thirder-style reasoning, to recapitulate,
can be set up as a contrast between different ways of basing one’s credences
on input probabilities Pr(H1) and Pr(H2): halfer-style reasoning identifies the
credences cr(H1) and cr(H2) themselves with Pr(H1) and Pr(H2); thirder-
style reasoning, in contrast, identifies the conditional credences cr(H1|n) and
cr(H2|n) with Pr(H1) and Pr(H2) (where n denotes self-locating information
such as birth rank in the Doomsday Argument or day of the week in SB).
The considerations offered in the previous sections can be seen as implicitly
suggesting a specific desideratum for how to form one’s credences in the light
of given input probabilities: the resulting credences should not be as if anyone
had anomalous causal powers. As demonstrated in the previous sections, assign-
ing credences in accordance with this desideratum yields consistently plausible
results for all problems discussed: Adam and Eve cannot be confident that a
wounded deer will appear; the Doomsday Argument is invalid; Sleeping Beauty
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should reason as recommended by the thirder response, which is excellently
motivated along independent lines.
The desideratum that no one should have credences that are as if any-
one had anomalous causal powers sheds an interesting light on scenarios in
which thirder-style reasoning leads to unattractive conclusions. What makes it
unattractive in such scenarios is its general preference for hypotheses that pre-
dict more observers over hypotheses that predict less. (In SB, it prefers more
“observers”—in the sense of awakenings—by preferring Tails over Heads in
that cr−(Tails) = 2/3 and cr−(Heads) = 1/3.) In cosmological theory choice,
for example, the general maxim to prefer cosmological theories that predict the
largest possible numbers of observers does not seem plausible.10
The crucial point for our present purposes is that an observer in cosmol-
ogy who identifies her credences cr(H1) and cr(H2) with the input probabilities
Pr(H1) and Pr(H2) (by whatever means she has arrived at the latter) does not
thereby violate our desideratum: unlike the credences of an observer who sets
cr(H1) = Pr(H1) and cr(H2) = Pr(H2) in the Doomsday Argument or the CB
problem, her credences are not as if anyone had anomalous causal powers. Since
cosmological theories do not depend for their correctness on any agent’s actions
or choices, our degrees of belief in them cannot possibly be as if any agent
had anomalous causal powers (which, by analogy, with the others problems dis-
cussed, would have to be powers to make some cosmological theory true). Thus,
the desideratum to avoid credences that are as if anyone had anomalous causal
powers does not give us any reason to adopt thirder-style reasoning in cosmol-
ogy, where it would lead to a general preference for cosmological theories that
predict large numbers of observers. Encouragingly for thirders about SB, this
points to a salient difference between SB and cosmological theory choice, which
suggests that one can coherently be a thirder about SB without committing
oneself to an unappealing principled preference for observer-rich cosmological
theories.
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